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WHY "UNDERFILING" BY STATES CAN AND 
SHOULD BE USED TO ENFORCE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
ALEX P. ABRAMS* 
Abstract: "Overfiling" occurs when the federal government files an 
environmental enforcement action in situations where the state envi-
ronmental enforcement agency has not sufficiently prosecuted a violator 
of a federal environmental statute. A recent case from the Tenth Circuit 
appears to support the idea of overfiling under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, and other courts have upheld overfiling 
actions under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. This Note 
argues that the practice of "underfiling," a process in which states file 
environmental enforcement actions even after the federal government 
has already overfiled, is also supported by these federal court decisions. 
This Note also suggests that states may intervene under Rule 24 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in federal environmental enforcement 
actions in order to seek additional relief from violators of environmental 
statutes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1970s, the federal government has enacted a 
number of environmental statutes designed to regulate the nation's 
air,! water,2 and hazardous waste.3 One of the common elements of 
these environmental statutes is that Congress has delegated enforce-
ment authority to individual state governments.4 While these envi-
ronmental statutes grant initial enforcement authority to the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), once a state can show that it 
has the capability of enforcing these regulations, EPA can then 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLI,EGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. 
1 Clean Air Act (CAA) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671c (2000). 
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA) , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (2000). 
3 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
4 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928, 7413. 
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authorize the state to enforce the law.5 This delegation of enforce-
ment authority is known as "cooperative federalism."6 
Federal environmental statutes thus encourage states to develop 
their own environmental programs that will allow them to enforce 
federal environmental laws, rather than relegating primary enforce-
ment responsibilities within their jurisdictions to the regional office of 
EPA.' While the state, after authorization by EPA, holds the status of 
primary enforcer of federal environmen tal laws, sometimes state envi-
ronmental agencies and EPA do not agree about how to properly en-
force federal environ men tal laws against a particular regulated or-
ganization or individual.s In these circumstances, EPA may decide to 
bring its own enforcement action against the organization or individ-
ual even if the state has already brought an enforcement action or 
negotiated a settlement.9 This process is known as overfiling and has 
been the subject of two recent federal circuit court cases, as well as a 
number of district court cases. lO 
The states' "ying" to the "yang" of federal overfiling has been 
termed "underfiling. "11 U nderfiling is when a state environ men tal 
agency, unsatisfied with the way in which EPA is handling its overfiled 
enforcement of environmental statutes against an individual or organi-
zation within its jurisdiction, files its own enforcement action against 
the individual or organization. l2 This can occur either while the federal 
enforcement action is still pending or after finality has been achieved 
through a court decision or a settlement agreement between the fed-
5 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928, 7413. 
6 Lisa Dittman, Comment, Overfiling: Policy Arguments in Support of tM Gorilla in tM 
Closet, 48 UCLA L. REV. 375, 376 (2000). 
7 See id. at 377. 
8 See id. 
9 See Susan K. Wiens & William P. Hefner, Disharmony in EPA's Overfiling Policy, 15 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 3,3 (2000). 
10 See generally United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001); United States v. LTV Steel 
Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 2000); United States v. City of Youngstown, 109 
F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
11 The term ·underfiling" was first used, according to the best information available, in 
July 2001 by Professor William Goldfarb of Rutgers University, in preparing the annual 
supplement to ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, 
LAW & SOCIETY (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001). 
12 See State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766, 768-69 (Va. 
2001). 
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eral government and the regulated party.13 It may seem unclear, 
though, why states would underfile a federal enforcemen t action, be-
cause one of the main goals of federal overfiling-to promote consis-
tency in the enforcement of environmental laws throughout the coun-
try-does not apply to individual states.14 Perhaps underfiling could be 
used to obtain differen t forms of relief than those available under the 
federal enforcement action, or to emphasize underlying political dif-
ferences with the federal government. Regardless, states have at-
tempted to use underfiling in their power struggle with EPA over en-
forcemen t of federal environ men tal regulations. 15 
A more pertinent question may be not why states would want to 
underfile, but rather if they are legally able to do so. While a state su-
preme court recen t1y ruled that the practice of underfiling was barred 
by the legal doctrine of res judicata,16 this Note will argue that the 
caselaw surrounding the overfiling issue actually overturns that deci-
sion and that underfiling can and should be pursued by states as a way 
to obtain other types of relief or for other reasons. Part I provides a 
background on the federal-state relationship in environmental en-
forcement, including overfiling and the applicability of res judicata to 
these actions. Part II discusses the court decisions that questioned the 
legality of federal overfilin g. Part III shows how federal courts have 
begun to move away from a prohibition on overfiling. Part IV explores 
the latest federal circuit court case regarding overfiling, which created 
a circuit split. Part V applies the courts' recent analysis of overfiling to 
the question of underfiling, explores whether underfiling can and 
should become an effective state enforcement mechanism, and sug-
gests an alternative to underfilingl7 should courts not approve using 
that mechanism. 
13 See Wiens & Hefner, supra note 9, at 3 (describing the situation as encountered with 
overfiling) . 
14 See Dittman, supra note 6, at 390-91. 
15 See, e.g., Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 766. 
16 See id. at 771. 
17 This Note also suggests utilizing intervention in overfiling cases under Rule 24 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires analyzing the possibility of interven-
tion under United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410 (5th Crr. 1991). 
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I. THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
A. Cooperative Federalism and OveTfiling 
Through cooperative federalism, the federal governmen t creates 
standards under statutes or regulations and then allows the states to 
determine how to meet them. IS Using this concept, federal environ-
mental statutes allow EPA to delegate enforcement authority to the 
states for the standards issued under these laws.19 This creates an ef-
fective use of limited federal resources for environmental regulation, 
and at the same time allows states to use more flexible and innovative 
techniques to find solutions to environmental problems and viola-
tions.20 Under the Clean Air Act (CAA),21 Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA),22 and Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA),23 however, the federal government also 
incorporated a strong federal oversight program to ensure that these 
standards were enforced uniformly throughout the country.24 
EPA's supervisory role allows it to either withdraw authorization 
of state environmental programs25 or utilize the practice known as 
overfiling.26 EPA has been reluctant to withdraw state authorization,27 
but has instead used the practice of overfiling,2S which allows the 
authorized state agencies to continue as the primary enforcers of the 
environmental statutes in other cases while EPA takes over primary 
enforcement in the overfiled matter.29 In a typical EPA overfiling, a 
regulated party who has violated federal environmental statutes has 
first negotiated with the authorized state agency regarding the viola-
tions, and these negotiations might result in a court approved settle-
18 Erik R. Lehtinen, Virginia As a Case Study: EPA. Should Be Willing to Withdraw NPDES 
Permitting Authority from Deficient States, 23 WM. & MARY ENV'IL. L. & POL'y REV. 617, 621 
(1999). 
19 Dittman, supra note 6, at 376. 
20 [d. 
2142 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671c (2000). 
2233 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
24 Wiens & Hefner, supra note 9, at 3. 
25 See Lehtinen, supra note 18, at 625-30. 
26 See id. at 619. 
27 [d. at 629. 
28 See id. at 631. 
29 See Stephen C. Robertson, State Permitting: United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. and 
Federal Overfiling Under the Clean Water Act, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 593,600 
(1999). 
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ment.30 Objecting to the settlement reached between these two par-
ties, EPA then brings its own enforcement action against the regulated 
party in federal court.31 This process can anger both the authorized 
state agencies and regulated parties because the prospect of overfiling 
by EPA creates uncertainty about the finality of any settlements 
reached between the regulated parties and the states,32 and it also lim-
its the states' flexibility in enforcing federal environmental standards 
within their jurisdictions.33 
B. Res Judicata 
Res judicata (sometimes referred to as claim preclusion) and col-
lateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion)34 are common law 
affirmative defenses embodying the principle that once a right, ques-
tion, or fact has been decided by a court, the same parties or their 
privies cannot relitigate the same right, question, or fact in a later law-
suit.35 While legal scholars have recently suggested broadening the 
phrase "res judicata" to include both issue and claim preclusion,36 the 
term "res judicata" in the con text of EPA overfiling decisions is under-
stood to include only claim preclusion,37 and thus the use of "res judi-
cata" in this Note should be understood in this manner. 
Res judicata treats a final judgment in a case as the full measure 
of relief to be gran ted to either party on the same claim or cause of 
action.38 In order for res judicata to apply, the following four features 
must be the same in both the curren t case and the previous lawsuit in 
which there was a final judgmen t: (1) the type of relief sough t; (2) the 
cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the actions; 
and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the 
claim is made.39 
:lO Dittman, supra note 6. at 377. 
31Id. 
32 See id. at 396. 
33 See id. 
M See William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel to EPA 
Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. Au. L. REV. 199,230-31 (1988). 
35 See id. at 231. 
36 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d 
ed.2002). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (lOth Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902-04 (8th 
Cir.1999). 
38 See Power Eng"g, 303 F.3d at 1240. 
39 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 902. 
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The main aspect of res judicata that courts are likely to confron t 
in overfiling and underfiling litigation is whether the identity of the 
person and parties to the action is the same as in a previously decided 
case.40 While EPA and state environmental enforcement agencies (the 
prosecuting parties in enforcement actions) are not actually the same 
parties, they may still be bound by res judicata,41 because EPA and 
state environmental agencies may be in privity with one another.42 In 
the recent overfiling litigation, courts have evaluated the question of 
privity with two different analyses.43 The first is a traditional analysis in 
which a court will preclude a party who was previously represented by 
another party with the authority to do SO.44 The second analysis is one 
in which a court will preclude a nonparty whose participation in the 
initial litigation was so extensive that it was a de facto party.45 
The two differen t privity analyses in recen t overfiling litigation 
are the result of two different federal cases decided about twen ty years 
ago.46 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. lIT Rayonier, Inc. used the 
first privity analysis.47 In this case, EPA filed suit after the company 
had successfully defeated an enforcemen t order by the State of Wash-
ington's Department of Ecology in state court.48 In examining the 
privity issue, the court noted that the state agency had filed only after 
EPA's instruction to do so and that the state agency vigorously as-
serted EPA's position in the state proceedings. 49 Additionally, the 
court found both parties to be enforcing the same permit.5o There-
fore, the state agency's and EPA's interests were identical, each had a 
level of involvement "sufficiently similar," and the relationship be-
tween the two agencies could be labeled "sufficiently 'close'" for pur-
poses of issue preclusion.51 This case was the first to hold that EPA 
40 See, e.g., Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240-41; Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 902-04. 
41 See Benton, supra note 34, at 248. 
42Id. 
43 Id. at 250. Benton actually describes cases in which that court analyzed privity in 
three different manners. Id. Recent overfiling decisions, however, used only two of the 
three privity analyses. See, e.g., Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240-41; Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 
902-04. 
44 Benton, supra note 34, at 250. 
45Id. 
46 See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); United States v. ITT 
Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
47 I1T Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1002-04. 
48Id. at 999. 
49 Id. at 1003. 
50Id. 
51Id. 
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and a state environmental enforcement agency were sufficiently close 
to bar an overfiling action in federal court.52 
The leading case for the second privity analysis is the Supreme 
Court case Montana v. United States.53 This was a case of pervasive and 
absolute control by a nonparty.54 The Court held that the federal gov-
ernment had a sufficient "'laboring oar'" in that litigation to actuate 
principles of collateral estoppel. 55 The Court found this "laboring 
oar" because the federal government admitted to exercising control 
over the state court litigation against the State of Montana, even 
though it was not officially a party to the Iitigation.56 As evidence of 
this federal control, the Court noted that the United States required 
the state lawsuit to be filed, reviewed and approved the complaint, 
paid attorneys' fees and costs, directed the appeal to the state su-
preme court, submitted an amicus brief in the state supreme court, 
directed the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, and later effec-
tuated the abandonment of that appeal.57 A court applying this privity 
analysis to overfiling will look at whether EPA had the opportunity to 
exercise sufficient control over a state and its enforcement action in 
order to be bound by the outcome.58 
C. Upholding the Right to Overfile 
The federal courts' recent decisions regarding overfiling began 
with United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.59 In this case, EPA sued a 
company that owned and operated two swine processing plants60 for 
violations of the CWA.61 Smithfield violated its permit by discharging 
pollutants into the Pagan River at levels beyond those allowed under 
the company's permit, in addition to falsifying and destroying certain 
records and reports.62 EPA initiated this suit after it appeared that the 
State of Virginia was not going to bring legal action against Smithfield 
52Id. 
53 440 U.S. 147 (1979). 
54 Benton, supra note 34. at 256. 
55 Montana, 440 U.S. at 155 (quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 
(1945». 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58 Benton, supra note 34, at 256. 
59 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999). 
60 Id. at 520. 
61 Id. at 523. 
62Id. 
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for its CWA violations.63 Instead of then joining the EPA lawsuit, Vir-
ginia filed its own enforcement action in state court alleging that 
Smithfield violated the terms of its permit, but claimed different types 
of violations than those claimed by EPA.64 In EPA's suit, the federal 
district court granted summary judgment for the United States on 
issues of liability in March of 1997, and then assessed a penalty of 
$12.6 million after a bench trial in July of 1997.65 The state enforce-
men t action proceeded at the same time as the federal case, and in 
July the state court announced a decree which permitted Smithfield 
to make a minor change in order to satisfy the terms of its permits.66 
Soon thereafter, on the basis of this decree in the state environ men tal 
enforcemen t action, Smithfield filed a motion to dismiss or alterna-
tively for summary judgment in the federal case.67 The district court 
declined Smithfield's request to reverse its liability finding,68 and the 
Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling.69 
This case's importance to the issue of underfiling is not so much 
in the circuit court's legal analysis,70 but rather because it was a rare 
example of EPA overfiling,71 which had never before been used quite 
so liberally as it was in this case.72 Additionally, EPA had lost the only 
overfiling case it had previously attempted,73 and thus was taking sub-
63Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Smithfield Foods, 191 F.3d at 523. 
66 Id. at 523-24. 
67 Id. at 524. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 532. 
70 This Note addresses whether one sovereign might be precluded from enforcing fed-
eral environmental regulations if another sovereign has already brought such an enforce-
ment action, which was most likely not decided in Smithfield Foods, Inc. The district court 
acknowledged that certain provisions of the CWA barred the United States from bringing 
a civil penalty action when a state enforcement agency ·'has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting an action under a State law'" which was comparable to those provisions of the 
CWA. Id. at 525 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (A) (ii) (2000». The district court found, 
however, that the Virginia enforcement law was not comparable in order to bar EPA's suit, 
thereby permitting overfiling. Id. While not applicable to Smithfield Foods, Inc., in 1996 Vir-
ginia amended its enforcement scheme in order to make it comparable to the provision of 
the CWA. Id. at 525 n.2. 
71 Lehtinen, supra note 18, at 617. 
72 Id. at 63l. 
73 See United Statesv. Cargill, 508 F. Supp. 734, 751 (D. Del. 1981). 
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stantiallegal and political risks.74 Finally, this case is the precursor to 
the major underfiling opinion discussed later in this Note.75 
II. LIMITS ON EPA's OVERFILING POWER 
A. The Harmon Decision 
Only two days after the Fourth Circuit announced its Smithfield de-
cision, the Eighth Circuit found that overfiling by EPA was prohibited 
under RCRA.76 In this case, employees of the company's Missouri cir-
cuitry board plant had been routinely discarding volatile solvent resi-
due behind the plant's buildings.77 Once management discovered this 
improper disposal, it ceased all such activities and voluntarily contacted 
the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR).78 The com-
pany and the MDNR created a plan by which the company would clean 
up the disposal area.79 In the midst of these settlement discussions be-
tween the company and the MDNR, EPA filed an administrative en-
forcement action against the company seeking more than $2 million in 
penalties.so While this EPA administrative action was pending, a state 
court judge approved a consent decree entered into by the company 
and the MDNR.81 Mter an assessment of penalties by an administrative 
law judge and an affirmation of the assessment by an environmental 
appeals board, the company filed a complain t in federal district court 
challenging EPA's decision.82 In upholding the district court's decision 
barring overfiling, the Eighth Circuit held that under both a statutory 
analysis of RCRA,83 as well as under the common law of res judicata,84 
EPA was barred from filing a competing enforcement action once a 
state had begun its own enforcement proceedings.85 
74 Robertson, supra note 29, at 607. 
75 The major underfiling opinion is State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 
S.E.2d 766 (Va. 2001). See infra Part II.B. 
76 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999). See generally 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928 (2000). 
77 HarrllOn Indus., 191 F.3d at 896. 
78Id. at 897. 
79Id. 
80 Id. 
8! Id. 
82Id. 
83 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 902. 
84 Id. at 904. 
85 See id. at 899, 904. 
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1. RCRA Statutory Analysis 
The court noted that according to the language of RCRA, a state 
can apply to EPA for authorization to administer and enforce a haz-
ardous waste program, and once the authorization is granted, the 
state's program operates "'in lieu of''' the federal government's own 
program.86 Additionally, RCRA states that any action taken by a state 
pursuant to an authorized hazardous waste program has "the same 
force and effect" as an action taken by EPA.s7 EPA argued that the dis-
trict court had misin terpreted the statutory phrases "in lieu of" and 
"same force and effect. "88 It believed that "in lieu of" referred to 
which statutes were to be enforced in an authorized state, and "same 
force and effect" referred to the effect of state-issued permits.89 Fur-
ther, EPA contended that the plain language of § 6928 allowed the 
federal government to initiate an enforcement action against a viola-
tor, even in states that have received RCRA authorization.90 
In contrast to EPA's view, the Eighth Circuit found that an ex-
amination of the statute as a whole supported the district court's in-
terpretation.91 While EPA was correct that the "in lieu of" language 
referred to the enforcement program, the court found that the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the program was "inexorably inter-
twined"; that RCRA contained congressional intent for state programs 
to replace the federal hazardous waste program in every aspect in-
cluding enforcement;92 and that RCRA's language established the 
"primacy of state enforcement" once the state had been granted 
authorization.93 The court held that the only way the federal govern-
ment has a right to pursue an enforcement action under RCRA is 
when a state's authorization has been revoked or when the state failed 
to initiate an enforcement action.94 
86 Id. at 899 (quoting 42 V.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000)). 
87 42 V.S.C. § 6926(d). 
88 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 898; see 42 V.S.C. § 6926. 
89 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 898; see 42 V.S.C. § 6926. 
90 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 898; see 42 V.S.C. § 6928. 
91 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 899. See generally Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 V.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
92 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 899; see 42 V.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928. 
93 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 900; see 42 V.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928. 
94 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 90l. 
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2. Res Judicata Analysis 
Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's 
finding that the state court consent decree barred EPA's enforcement 
action under principles of res judicata.95 While believing that all four 
distinct requirements for res judicata were met in this case,96 the court 
noted that the only one in dispute was whether the parties were iden-
tical.97 Though the United States and Missouri were not the same 
party, the court noted that parties can satisfy the identical party re-
quirement when the new party is in privity with a party that litigated a 
prior suit, and that privity exists when the two parties have "'a close 
relationship bordering on near identity.'''98 The court found that the 
statutory language in RCRA creates a situation in which the federal 
and state environmental enforcement agencies "stand in the same re-
lationship to one another," and Missouri law supports a finding of 
privity when the two parties "represent the same legal right. "99 As a 
result, EPA and Missouri were in privity because they both advanced 
the exact same legal right under RCRA in their own respective en-
forcement actions.IOO Further, the court found that privity is not de-
pendent on the subjective interests of the individual parties, and thus 
EPA's argument that it had enforcement interests sufficiently distinct 
from Missouri's interests did not sway the court's decision}Ol 
The court also rejected EPA's argument that unless it was actually 
a party to the prior lawsuits, the doctrine of sovereign immunity pre-
cluded the application of res judicata in this situation}02 The court 
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States which 
held that if the United States "'had a sufficient laboring oar in the 
conduct of the state-court litigation,''' this could bring about princi-
ples of estoppel.103 The court found that while the federal govern-
ment did not directly control the details of a prior state suit as in Mon-
tana,104 in RCRA cases the federal government authorizes the state to 
act in its place, and thus the "'laboring oar' is pulled on much earlier 
95 Id. at 902. 
96 See supra Part I.B. 
97 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 903. 
98 Id. (quoting United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188,1197 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
10! Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 903 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
155 (1979)). 
104 See Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. 
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in the process. "105 After this authorization, the state pursues enforce-
ment actions "in lieu of" EPA, and therefore EPA must be bound by 
prior state actions initiated under RCRA.106 The Hannon opinion thus 
produced much uncertainty as to whether EPA was allowed to overfile 
under RCRA and other federal environmental statutes.107 
B. Applying the Harmon Doctline to Block Underjiling 
In 2001, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed a new wrinkle in 
overfiling-whether a state could underfile once a final ruling had 
been litigated in a federal enforcement action. IOS After declining to 
join EPA's enforcement activity against Smithfield,lo9 which ultimately 
resulted in a large penalty against the company,110 the State Water 
Control Board and the Department of Environmental Quality (collec-
tively "the Board") filed a suit in state court to enforce violations of a 
previously negotiated administrative order and of portions of a pollu-
tion discharge permit unrelated to the order.lll After the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the penalties assessed by EPA against Smithfield, the 
company filed a plea in the state action, asserting that res judicata 
now barred the state enforcement action.112 
As in Hannon Industries, Inc. v. Browne1; the only requirement of res 
judicata at issue before the court was the iden tity of the parties. ll3 The 
Board argued that privity did not exist because: (1) its in terests in pro-
tecting the waters of Virginia, and thus the legal rights it sought to pro-
tect, were derived from the Virginia Constitution and the State Water 
Control Law; and (2) it did not share a subjective intent to coordinate 
the enforcement of the permit with EPA1l4 The court, however, found 
these arguments unconvincing. ll5 It believed that the most important 
fact in the case was that the interests and rights of both EPA and the 
)05 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 904 (citing Montana, 440 U.S at 155). 
\06Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), (d) (2000)). 
\07 See generally Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 904; Environmental Enforcement Becomes Federal-
ism's Hazardous Battleground, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 896 (May 5, 2000) (discussing EPA's 
viewpoint of the Harmon and Smithfield decisions) [hereinafter Environmental Enforcement]. 
)08 See State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766, 768 (Va. 
2001 ). 
\09Id. 
110 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 531 (4th Cir. 1999). 
111 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 768. 
112Id. 
113 Id. at 769; see Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999). 
114 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 769-70. 
115 Id. at 770. 
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Board were "vested in a single permit" for water pollution discharge.1l6 
The court also noted that the ability of both the Board and EPA to un-
dertake enforcement activities did not "override the joint undertaking 
based on the agreement authorizing the state enforcement pro-
gram."ll7 This agreement said that the permit issued by the Board 
would protect the separate but mutual interests of both the state and 
federal governments. lIS Thus, the Board and EPA shared an "identity of 
interest" in the permit issued to Smithfield, and the Board's legal rights 
were represented when EPA prosecuted the company}19 
The court found that its conclusion was consisten t with federal 
cases which had considered the issue of res judicata.120 For instance, it 
noted that the Harmon court had concluded that res judicata applied 
because the state advanced the same legal right as EPA.121 fu addition, 
the court found that, like in Harmon Industries, Inc., privity did not re-
quire the parties to share a subjective intent--either they shared an ob-
jective "identity of interest" or they did not.122 Further, while the Board 
argued that privity is precluded when EPA has independent enforce-
ment powers, the court held that according to the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. nT Rayonier, Inc.,123 the existence of concurrent en-
forcemen t powers did not con tradict the application of res judicata. 124 
Rather, the court found that determining privity between parties re-
quired a case-by-case analysis utilizing the principles of that doctrine. 125 
III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS LIMIT THE APPLICATION OF THE 
HARMON DOCTRINE 
State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. is the only known 
case in which courts have adopted the Hannon rationale and applied 
it to prevent dual enforcement of federal environmental laws by 
both the state and federal governments.126 Since that decision, nu-
116Id. 
JI7 Id. 
118Id. 
119Id. 
120 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 770. 
121 Id.; see Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Crr. 1999). 
122 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 771; see Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 903. 
123 627 F.2d 996 (9th Crr. 1980). 
124 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 770-71. 
125 Id. at 771. 
126 Gary A. Jonesi, ·Single Pennit Theory· Bars State Water Enforcement Action on Res Judi-
cata Grounds, NAT. ENV"TL. ENFORCEMENT J., Apr. 2001, at 3. See generally Harmon Indus., 
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merous federal district courts have limited the application of the 
Hannon analysis.127 
A. Overjiling Under the Clean Water Act 
The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency filed an enforcement 
action against the City of Youngstown under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).128 Meanwhile, EPA brought its own enforcement action against 
Youngstown, and Youngstown claimed that under Hannon Industlies, 
Inc., EPA could not bring an enforcement action where the state was 
already pursuing its own separate enforcement action.129 The court re-
jected Youngstown's reliance on Harmon Industlies, Inc. for two rea-
sons.130 First, it found that the Sixth Circuit had decided that the fed-
eral government retained a right to file a similar enforcement action 
even after it granted enforcement authority of the CWA to a state 
agency.13l Second, it refused to draw a parallel between the enforce-
ment provisions as analyzed in Harmon Industries, Inc. under RCRA.132 
and those found in the CWA.133 Unlike the Harmon court's finding that 
RCRA barred overfiling,134 the court here found that because the CWA 
did not contain language similar to RCRA's "in lieu of" or "same force 
and effect,"135 but instead stated that the federal enforcement was not 
so limited,136 the CWA did not bar federal overfiling.137 The Youngstown 
court, however, did not address the question of res judicata. 
Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1999); State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, 
Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766 (Va. 2001). 
127 See United States v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1087-93, 1116-
17 (W.D. Wis. 2001); United States v. L1V Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (N.D. Ohio 
2000); United States v. City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
128 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 741. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(2000). 
129 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 740; see Harmon Indus., Inc., 191 F.3d at 897-
903. 
130 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
13l Id. 
1!2 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
l!l3 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
184 Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 902. 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), (d) (2000). 
136 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i) (2000). 
1!7 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
2004] State "Underjiling" and Environmental Enforcement 417 
B. Overfiling Under the Clean Air Act 
Later in 2000, the same court addressed both the statutory per-
missibility of overfiling under the Clean Air Act (CAA) ,138 as well as 
the implications ofresjudicata on enforcement by separate sovereigns 
of federal environmentallaws.139 In this case, the defendant, L1V, had 
negotiated a monetary settlement with the City of Cleveland in ex-
change for Cleveland agreeing not to pursue civil or criminal misde-
meanor actions for violation of emissions regulations.t40 A year later, 
EPA issued a violations notice to L1V for emissions infractions, some 
of which were subjects of L1V's settlement with Cleveiand.141 Much 
like in City oJ Youngstown, 142 the court rejected L1V's claims that a state 
settlement precluded federal enforcement under Harmon's analysis of 
RCRA.143 The court found that the Harmon court's statutory analysis 
was based on language found in RCRA, and that this language was not 
in the CAA.I44 
Unlike in City oj Youngstown, this court also added a res judicata 
analysis of whether the overfiling was permissible.t45 While noting that 
L1V did not satisfy the same claim/cause of action requirement of res 
judicata,l46 it went on to analyze the issue of privity between the City 
and EPA.147 It found that any preclusive effect must be determined by 
the level of federal participation in the previous enforcemen t ac-
tions.148 The court, applying Montana v. United States, required the 
United States to have maintained a laboring oar in the earlier pro-
ceedings and settlement.149 The court held that to determine whether 
the United States actually had a laboring oar, a court may look to fac-
tors such as whether it ordered the other party to file the lawsuit, filed 
an amicus brief, directed an appeal, or engaged in settlement negotia-
tions.t50 The court found that EPA had done none of these things and 
138 United Statesv. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-35 (N.D. Ohio 2000); see 42 
U.S.C. § 7413 (2000). 
189 LTVStee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 835-37. 
140 [d. at 830. 
141 [d. 
142 City of Youngstown, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 739. 
14! LTV Stee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 832; see supra Part II.A.I. 
144 LTV Stee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 832; see Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 
897-902 (8th Cir. 1999). 
145 LTV Stee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 835-37. 
140 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
147 LTV Stee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
148 [d. 
149 [d.; see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979). 
150 LTV Stee~ 118 F. Supp. 2d at 836; see Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. 
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therefore had no laboring oar in Cleveland's prior enforcement ef-
forts or in its settlement with LlV.t51 Thus, there was no privity be-
tween EPA and Cleveland under a traditional res judicata analysis.152 
C. Overjiling After a State Settlement 
In another overfiling case, EPA sued Murphy Oil USA, a petro-
leum refinery, for violations of a number of federal environmental 
statutes after the company had settled some of these violations with 
the State of Wi sconsin.1 53 The court analyzed the issue of overfiling in 
the contexts of both the CAA and RCRA.tM 
In regard to the CAA violations, the court performed a res judi-
cata analysis, focusing on the question of privity between the federal 
and state governments.155 Like in City of Youngstown and LTV Steel Co., 
the Muryhy Oil court found that the res judicata prohibition as ap-
plied in Harmon Industries, Inc. was based on the specific language 
contained in RCRA, and that this language did not appear in the 
CAA.156 Rather, an analysis of § 7413(e) of the CAA provided addi-
tional support for federal overfiling because: (I) Congress anticipated 
overfiling and approved it by allowing prior penalties to be taken into 
consideration in determining new penalties; (2) the 1970 amend-
ments showed a congressional intent to respond to the slow progress 
of enforcement solely by states; and (3) the CAA lacked any reference 
to conditions on taking federal action.157 
Furthermore, the court, applying Montana v. United States, found 
that the United States did not have a laboring oar in the contro-
versy.t58 EPA did not direct the state to file its enforcement action, pay 
the state's costs or attorney's fees, or direct the course of litigation or 
terms of settlement.159 Even though EPA closely monitored the state's 
enforcement action, that did not bring EPA into such a close working 
151 L1V Steel, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
152 [d. 
15! United States v. Murphy Oil USA, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1062, 1087-92, 1114-17 
(W.D. Wis. 2001). 
154 [d. at 1087-92, 1114-17. 
155 [d. at 1087-92. 
156 Murphy Oil USA, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91; see Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 
191 F.3d 894, 897-902 (8th eir. 1999). 
157 Murphy Oil USA, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1091. 
158 [d. at 1092; see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
159 Mltl'jJhy Oil USA, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
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relationship with the state government as to make the parties equiva-
len t for purposes of res judicata.160 
For the RCRA violations, Murphy Oil USA rested its challenge to 
EPA's enforcement action entirely on Harmon Industlies, Inc. 161 While 
the present case differed from Hannon Industlies, Inc.,162 the Murphy Oil 
court still analyzed the RCRA violations through a discussion of 
overfiling.163 The court disagreed with the Hannon court's interpreta-
tion of RCRA; that is, by giving states the right to implement and en-
force hazardous waste programs, EPA could not pursue enforcement 
unless it withdrew a state's RCRA authorization.164 Rather, the court 
found that the structure of RCRA suggests that the statute allows the 
federal government to bring enforcement actions in authorized states 
conditioned only on providing sufficient notice to the state govern-
ment. 165 
IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT DEVELOPS 
While City of Youngstown, LTV Steel Co., and Murphy Oil USA all de-
clined to extend the Hannon doctrine,166 they were only district court 
decisions. It was not until 2002 that another circuit court addressed 
the question of overfiling.167 The defendant, Power Engineering, op-
erated a metal refinishing and chrome electroplating business that 
produced hazardous waste covered by RCRA.168 The Colorado De-
partment of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) issued an ad-
ministrative penalty order-later found enforceable by a state court-
after Power Engineering refused to comply with an initial compliance 
order.169 Before the CDPHE issued its administrative penalty order, 
EPA requested that the CDPHE enforce RCRA's financial assurance 
requirements against Power Engineering.170 The CDPHE did not en-
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 1114. 
162 [d. In Murphy Oil USA, the court had stayed the state enforcement action, the court 
had not issued a decision or approved a consent judgment, and the parties had yet to 
agree to a settlement. [d. 
163 See id. at 1114-17. 
164 [d. at 1116; see supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
165 Murphy Oil USA, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
166 See supra Part III. 
167 United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. 
Ct. 1929 (2003). 
168 [d. at 1235. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. 
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force such provisions within the administrative penalty order, so EPA 
filed its own suit against Power Engineering.l7l While Power Engineer-
ing wanted the court to follow the Harmon decision,I72 the court flatly 
rejected both the Eighth Circuit's statutory and res judicata analysis in 
that case.173 
A. Statutory Analysis 
The starting point for the court in Power EnginceJing Co. was that 
the RCRA provisions at issue were ambiguous.174 Thus, the court would 
defer to the federal agency's reasonable in terpretation of the statute-
an interpretation that permitted overfiling-according to the Chevron 
doctrine.175 Sections 6926 and 6928 of RCRAI76 were at issue in the 
case,177 The court found that § 6928(a) required the federal govern-
ment only to have to give notice to a state whose hazardous waste pro-
gram is authorized before instituting its own enforcement action.178 It 
also found that § 6926(b) reasonably could be interpreted as separating 
the state's authorization to carry out its program in lieu of the federal 
program from its authorization to issue and enforce permits.179 There-
fore, EPA's conclusion that the administration and enforcement of 
RCRA were not "inexorably intertwined"-that state program authori-
zation did not strip EPA of its enforcement powers-was not unreason-
able. lso Because RCRA was ambiguous, the court had to defer to EPA's 
reasonable in terpretation .181 
171Id. 
172 Id. at 1236; see supra notes 76-107 and accompanying text. 
173 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240,1241. 
174 Id. at 1237. 
175 Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) 
(holding that if a statute is silent or ambiguous, a court should defer to the agency's inter-
pretation if based on a permissible construction of the statute and thus must accept the 
agency's interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious. or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute"); Power Eng'g. 303 F.3d at 1236-37. 
176 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6928 (2000). 
177 Power Eng'g. 303 F.3d at 1237. 
178 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a). 
179 Power Eng'g. 303 F.3d at 1237; see 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). 
180 Power Eng'g. 303 F.3d at 1238. 
181 Id. at 1240; see Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc .• 467 U.S. 837, 
842-44 (1984). 
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B. Res Judicata 
The court analyzed the question of privity between the United 
States and Colorado for res judicata purposes under Montana, Harmon 
Industries, Inc., and ITT Rayonier; Inc. 1S2 Applying Montana, the court 
recognized that a finding of a laboring oar in the controversy would 
be necessary to bind the United States as a party.l83 The court, how-
ever, found that none of the factors listed in Montana were present in 
the Power Engineering case, and thus there was no evidence that EPA 
assumed control over the litigation. l84 But even if the laboring oar 
could be pulled by a delegation of authority as in Harmon Industries, 
IIlC.,l85 the court made a distinction when state governments act "in 
lieu of" EPA only with respect to administration of the program and 
issuance of permits.186 Thus, the Power Engineering court found no 
complete delegation to the states.1S7 Finally, the court distinguished 
ITT Rayonier; Inc. because that case did not follow the laboring oar 
analysis, but rather relied heavily on the identical interest between the 
state agency and EPA.1SS The court found that, unlike in ITT Rayonier; 
Inc., the CDPHE did not maintain the "same position" as EPA since 
the CDPHE did not seek financial assurances as EPA had requested. 
Therefore, the two agencies did not have identical interests. l89 In con-
clusion, the court declined to extend the doctrine of privity to cover 
the situation in this case.190 
V. ANALYSIS OF UNDERFILING 
On May 5, 2003, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Power En-
gineering CO.191 Thus, the questions about the legality of overfiling and 
underfiling remain open. In order to address these open issues, this 
Note argues that in a post-Power Engineering legal environment, courts, 
when assessing the legality of underfiling, should allow it. Additionally, 
182 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240-41; see supra Parts I.B, II.A.2. 
183 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240; see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 
(1979) . 
184 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241. 
185 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir. 1999). 
186 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241. 
187 See id. 
188Id.; see United States v. rrr Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996,1003 (9th Cir. 1980). 
189 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241. 
190 [d. 
191 United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (lOth Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. 
Ct. 1929 (2003). 
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this Part suggests important policy arguments in regards to overfiling 
and underfiling, and comments on one alternative to underfiling. 
A. The Legality of Underjiling 
The legality of underfiling is analyzed under the legal doctrine of 
res judicata.192 While overfiling decisions considered statutory permis-
sibility under federal environmental laws, as well as res judicata con-
cerns, only the federal government is uniquely restricted under fed-
eral environmental statutes.193 Therefore, states might have greater 
freedom to pursue underfiling than the federal govern men t has in 
pursuing overfiling.194 
State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. is the only published 
state court opinion dealing with the underfiling question. The court 
concluded that because the Board and EPA determined that their in-
terests in protecting the water would be protected by the single permit, 
privity existed between the two different enforcement agencies for res 
judicata purposes.195 This decision, however, relied primarily on two 
cases, Hannon Industries, Inc. and ITT Rayonier, Inc., that have lately be-
come questionable.196 The EPA Senior Counsel who filed the amicus 
brief in this case argued that if the court had considered whether Vir-
ginia had played an active role in the earlier litigation, using the labor-
ing oar test,197 it would have found that Virginia had no laboring oar or 
any other role in the previous federal litigation, despite a rejected invi-
tation from the federal government to join its SUit. 19B hldeed, Virginia 
did none of the Montana factors.199 Thus, while the court considered a 
192 See supra Parts I.B, ILA.2, II.B, and N.B. 
193 This is because even if there are restrictions on overfiling to be found in federal en-
vironmental statutes, they only apply to the federal government. The idea that states are 
allowed to pursue their own enforcement actions can be inferred from the fact that they 
have primary enforcement authority under federal environmental statutes after being 
authorized by the federal government. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
194 Since states are not statutorily barred from pursuing underfiling, the only restriction 
might be res judicata concerns. However, generally state governments and the federal gov-
ernment are considered two separate parties for res judicata. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4458 (2d ed. 2002). 
195 State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766, 770-71 (Va. 
2001 ). 
196 See Environmental Enforcement, supra note 126, at 3; see also Harmon Indus., Inc. v. 
Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
197 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979). 
198 See Environmental Enforcement, supra note 126, at 3. 
199 See Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. Virginia did not require the federal lawsuit to be filed, 
review or approve the federal complaint, pay attorney's fees and costs, direct any appeals, 
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join t permit program the sole test for privity, a more appropriate one 
may have been an analysis under Montana. 
The Montana privity test, however, was applied by the Ten th Cir-
cuit in Power Engineering CO.200 The court started its analysis by noting 
that for purposes of res judicata, the federal and state governments 
are usually considered separate parties unless the federal government 
had a laboring oar in a controversy.201 This occurs when the federal 
government assumes control over the litigation.202 Furthermore, since 
none of the Montana factors were present in the Power Engineeting Co. 
overfiling, there was no evidence that EPA assumed control over the 
litigation, and thus was not in privity with the state environmental 
agency.203 This appears to be the more sensible interpretation of the 
case law under which the question of privity for overfiling and un-
derfiling has been analyzed-ITT Rayonier, Inc. and Montana. 204 The 
Power Engineering court recognized that unlike in ITT Rayonier, Inc., 
the Colorado environ men tal agency did not main tain the same posi-
tion as EPA and did not do certain things that EPA had requested.205 
EPA was not in privity with the state agencies because: (1) any delega-
tion of authority by EPA to the states was limited; and (2) the two 
agencies had different interests.206 
A determination of privity by a future court in the context of un-
derfiling should proceed according to the analysis in Power Engineeting 
CO.207 While some courts may look to the Smithfield Foods, Inc. opin-
ion208 for guidance, as it is the only reported decision on state un-
derfiling, an analysis of privity in the context of underfiling using the 
Power Engineering Co. approach appears to be more appropriate. Thus, 
courts should look to see whether the state environmental enforce-
ment agency had a laboring oar in the federal litigation, comparing 
the factors which evidenced "con trol over the litigation" in Montana 
or submit an amicus brief. See id. Rather, Virginia filed its own enforcement action. 
Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 768. 
200 United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232,1240-41 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003); see Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. 
201 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1240. 
2021d. 
2031d. at 124l. 
204 See supra Part I.B. See generally Montana, 440 U.S. 147; United States v. ITT Rayonier, 
Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
205 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241; see lIT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1003. 
206 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241. 
207 ld. at 1240-4l. 
208 State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766 (Va. 2001). 
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to the facts in the case before the court.209 In most cases a court will 
likely not find a laboring oar because the reason for the state pursu-
ing its own enforcemen t action is that it does not wan t to cooperate 
with the federal govern men t. Additionally, a court should use the 
Power Engineming Co. court's analysis of ITT lWyonier, Inc.210 and de-
termine whether the state agency vigorously maintained the same po-
sition as EPA, and whether it had performed as EPA had requested 
them. Again, where a state is trying to underfile an EPA enforcement 
action, it is likely that it is not maintaining the same position as EPA-
as it might be seeking more stringent damages, a different type of 
remedy, or has other motives for underfiling that would differentiate 
its position from that of EPA. Thus, after Power Engineering Co., courts 
should find no privity between a state enforcement agency and EPA 
when the state underfiles, unless the state had a laboring oar in the 
federal litigation or is maintaining the same position as EPA.21l 
B. Policy Arguments Jor Under filing 
The policy arguments in favor and against underfiling can be 
both compared and contrasted to those of overfiling.212 The main pol-
icy argument in favor of overfiling is that it encourages states to be 
diligent enforcers of environmental laws, because EPA always retains 
the right file an enforcement action when it feels that the state is not 
meeting its responsibilities as the primary enforcer.213 Additionally, 
many argue that overfiling is useful because it conserves scarce envi-
ronmental enforcement resources.214 Rather than EPA withdrawing 
authorization whenever it believes a state is not living up to its en-
forcement mandate-thus becoming the primary environmental en-
forcer in that jurisdiction itself, along with all the costs associated with 
such a responsibility-EPA can bring its own enforcement action in 
certain situations where it believes that the state has not acted prop-
erly without revoking the state agency's status as primary enforcer.215 
On the other hand, the main policy argumen t against overfiling 
is that because a state environmental agency will not be the only party 
209 Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. 
210 Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d at 1241 (citing ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1003). 
211 See id. at 1240-41 (citing Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55). 
212 See generally Dittman, supra note 6 (describing policy arguments for and against 
overfiling) . 
213 See id. at 390-92. 
214 Lehtinen, supra note 18, at 630; Robertson, supra note 29, at 606. 
215 See Lehtinen, supra note 18, at 630. 
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who can assess penalties, this will create uncertainty for regulated par-
ties, and negotiations with states as the primary enforcers of environ-
mental laws will not be as fruitful. 216 This will reduce the resources 
available to enforce environ men tal regulations and thereby limit their 
effectiveness.217 Additionally, opponents of overfiling argue that the 
mechanism is fundamentally unfair, especially where the regulated 
parties are making a good faith effort to work with the state agen-
cies.21B This uncertainty and unfairness might also encourage regu-
lated parties not to self-report environmental violations, and in this 
way, overfiling might discourage this very irnportan t regulation 
mechanism in environmentallaw.219 
Policy argumen ts in favor of underfiling are a bit differen t. States 
should be allowed to underfile because EPA enforcement might not 
always incorporate all of the types of remedies a state is seeking from a 
regulated party which violates environmental laws. This creates an in-
cen tive for a regulated party to make sure it is complying with all envi-
ronmental regulations, because if it is discovered to be in violation, 
the state, the federal government, or a combination of both, could 
bring enforcement actions requiring the regulated party to pay sub-
stantial fines and clean-up costs. Permitting underfiling also prevents 
a race to the courthouse.22o This can be harmful, because if such a 
race occurs, it is likely that some enforcemen t actions will be rushed 
and thoughtless in order to avoid being precluded.221 
Those against permitting the use of underfiling cite the unfairness 
and uncertainty ofthe practice because a regulated party could be pun-
ished by two different enforcement agencies for the same act.222 Unlike 
overfiling, though, the argument for uncertainty would be less preva-
lent in underfiling because the regulated party would not have come to 
any final agreement with the state, as evidenced by the state filing suit 
after the federal government had already decided to take action. 
216 Dittman, supra note 6, at 396. 
217Id. 
218 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, Power Eng'g Co. v. United States, 303 F.3d 
1232 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003) (No. 02-1086). 
219 Dittman, supra note 6, at 397-98. 
220 Environmental Enjorcemcnt. supra note 126, at 3. 
221Id. 
222 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, Power Eng'g (No. 02-1086). 
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C. The Alternative of Intervention 
While this Note argues that underfiling should be pursued and 
upheld as legal by federal and state courts, states may have an alterna-
tive option when they are trying to obtain additional relief after EPA 
has already filed an enforcemen t action in federal court against a 
regulated party. This alternative would be to move for either in terven-
tion of right or permissive in terven tion in the federal case under Rule 
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.223 Intervention of right, 
according to Rule 24 (a), must be permitted when either: (1) a federal 
statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) the "dispo-
sition of the action may impair or impede the applicant's ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately rep-
resen ted by existing parties. "224 Courts also have the discretion to 
gran t permissive in terven tion when a federal statute confers a condi-
tional right to intervene, or when an applicant's claim or defense and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.225 States 
may thus be able to use these two types of in terven tion to become a 
party in an EPA enforcement action. 
Intervention by individual states in a federal case in which EPA is 
enforcing environmental statutes may be limited, however, by United 
States v. Texas Eastern Transmission C01P.226 In this case, the company 
operated a natural gas pipeline that ran from Texas to New York and 
passed through Pennsylvania.227 Mter EPA learned that the company 
was allowing the release of toxic chemicals at eighty-nine sites in four-
teen states along the pipeline system, it filed a complaint in federal 
district court alleging the company violated numerous federal envi-
ronmental statutes.228 Along with the complaint, EPA submitted a 
consent decree which the agency and the company had negotiated, 
and then moved for a stay of the district court proceeding to allow for 
notice and comment on the proposed consent decree.229 During this 
notice and comment period, Pennsylvania and several other states 
filed motions to intervene, but the district court denied all of the in-
tervention motions.23o 
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
224 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
225 FED. R. CIV. P.24(b). 
226 923 F.2d 4lO (5th Cir. 1991). 
227 Id. at 412. 
228Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of motion to 
intervene of right and dismissed the appeal from the district court's 
denial of the motion for permissive intervention.231 While the court 
quickly concluded that its review of the permissive intervention appeal 
was limited to an abuse of discretion standard because the district 
court's decision was completely discretionary,232 it discussed more fully 
the question of Pennsylvania's intervention of right.233 Pennsylvania 
argued that it met the requirements for intervention of right because: 
"(1) the consent decree may adversely effect Pennsylvania's enforce-
ment efforts because of principles of res judicata and stare decisis, (2) the 
consent decree may preempt Pennsylvania laws, and (3) the consent 
decree may cause Pennsylvania to have to litigate the preemption issue 
in a subsequent action against Texas Eastern."234 The court rejected the 
latter two claims under the theory that they were too speculative to sat-
isfy the Rule 24 requiremen t that the disposition of the federal action 
would impair or impede Pennsylvania's ability to protect its interests. 235 
In terms of the res judicata claim, the court held that Pennsylvania had 
not satisfied the requirements of Rule 24(a) (2),236 because it was not a 
party to the federal action, the consent decree contained ample protec-
tions for Pennsylvania's laws, and its argument that a future judge 
might determine Texas Eastern's compliance with the consent decree 
relieved the company from complying with state laws was too theoreti-
cal.237 The court also dismissed Pennsylvania's stare decisis argument, 
which claimed that if EPA was authorized to enforce RCRA here, stare 
decisis might impair Pennsylvania's future environmental enforcement 
capabilities.238 The court found that because the district court's ruling 
was fact specific, it would not affect Pennsylvania's ability to enforce its 
own laws in the future.239 
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. was decided before any of the re-
cent overfiling and underfiling decisions. Nonetheless, the court's 
analysis of intervention of right, in particular its res judicata analy-
sis,240 is important in the context of overfiling and underfiling. Since 
231 Id. at 416. 
232 Tex. E. Transmission, 923 F.2d at 416. 
233 Id. at 413-16. 
234Id. at 413. 
235 Id. at 414-16. 
236 Id. at 414 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24). 
237Id. 
238 Tex. E. Transmission, 923 F.2d at 414. 
239Id. 
240 Id. at 413-14. 
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the courts in both Hannon Industries, Inc. and Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
barred enforcement actions on res judicata grounds filed by one sov-
ereign after the other sovereign already had a finalized negotiated 
agreement or a court judgment against the regulated party,241 it seems 
that a state should be allowed to intervene in a federal environmental 
enforcement action because the disposition of the case might impair 
or impede its ability to enforce its rights.242 Since some courts post-
Texas Eastern Transmission C01P. have found privity between the state 
environmen tal agencies and EPA,243 an argumen t of res judicata is not 
as theoretical as the Texas Eastern court described it.244 Therefore, un-
less a judgment or consent decree contains specific provisions allow-
ing states to later prosecute a regulated party who is being prosecuted 
by EPA in federal court,245 states should be allowed to intervene as a 
matter of right in the federal case. 
At least one state has con templated the possibility of in terven tion 
in a federal court proceeding when the dispute is being litigated by 
the federal government through EPA.246 Virginia passed a statute 
permitting intervention following the outcome in Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
which barred its enforcement action because of res judicata.247 The 
statute specifically provides that, in addition to the authority possessed 
by the different state environmental agencies and their directors to 
enforce any law, regulation, case decision, or condition of a permit or 
certification, the state attorney general is authorized on behalf of 
these agencies and directors to seek to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 
in federal cases in which EPA is litigating a dispute.248 Although the 
statute gives the attorney general the right to pursue intervention in 
federal courts, courts will most likely apply Texas Eastern Transmission 
C01P.249 and the res judicata analysis discussed earlier in this Note in 
determining whether to grant in tervention.250 
241 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir. 1999); State Water Con-
trol Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Va. 2001). 
242 See FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). 
243 See Hannon Indus., 191 F.3d at 904; Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 771. 
244 Tex. E. Transmission, 923 F.2d at 414. 
245Id. 
246 See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.4 (Supp. 2003). 
247 Id.; Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 771. 
248 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.4. 
249 Tex. E. Transmission, 923 F.2d at 410. 
250 See supra Part LB. 
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CONCLUSION 
Underfiling should and can be used by states as an effective en-
forcement mechanism. It is another way in which society can make sure 
that environmental statutes and regulations are enforced to the fullest 
extent possible. vVhile states should be effectively enforcing environ-
mental statutes in order to prevent overfiling, states should still be able 
to extract other types of relief from parties through underfiling once 
overfiling occurs. Alternatively, states should also consider intervention 
in a federal enforcemen t action by passing legislation such as that in 
Virginia, because if other courts decide to bar underfiling on res judi-
cata grounds, then states will have another option. 
Moreover, the most recent overfiling case, Power Engineering Co., 
seems to support the idea of underfiling. By dismissing the notion 
that res judicata concerns would bar overfiling by the federal gov-
ernment, it implicitly confirms the idea that underfiling is not barred 
by res judicata as well. And although the only reported case of state 
underfiling came out against the legality of the practice, that case may 
turn out to be the anomaly. Since the Supreme Court did not grant 
certiorari to decide Power EngineeJing Co., and until another case like it 
is decided by the Court, lower courts should permit underfiling, in 
addition to overfilin g, because the legal concepts of res judicata are 
not violated by enforcement of environmental laws by both the state 
and federal governments. 

